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Abstract
The revelation principle asserts that for any indirect mechanism and equilibrium,
there is a corresponding direct mechanism with truth as an equilibrium. Although
the revelation principle has been a fundamental theorem in the theory of mechanism
design for a long time, so far the costs related to strategic actions of agents have
not been fully discussed. In this paper, we propose the notion of prot function,
and claim that the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism should be
based on the prot function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents
are costly (see Denition 23.D.1'). After then, we derive two key results: (1) The
strategic action of each agent in a direct mechanism is just to report a type, and each
agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect mechanism
(see Proposition 1); (2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation
principle is wrong (see Proposition 2). We construct a simple labor model to show
that a Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable
(see Proposition 4), which contradicts the revelation principle.
JEL codes: D71, D82
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in mechanism design theo-
ry [1{3]. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston and Green (Page 884, Line 24 [3]): \The implication of the revelation
principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully
implementable." Put in other words, the revelation principle says: \suppose
that there exists a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium" (Page 76, Theorem 2.4, [4]). Relevant denitions about the
revelation principle are given in Section 2, which are cited from Section 23.B
and 23.D of MWG's textbook [3].
Generally speaking, agents may spend some costs when participating a mech-
anism. There are two kinds of costs possibly occurred in a mechanism: 1)
strategic costs, which are possibly spent by agents when performing strate-
gic actions 1 ; 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly spent by agents when
reporting types falsely. 2 In the traditional literature of mechanism design,
costs are usually referred to the former. Recently, some researchers began to
investigate misreporting costs. For every type  and every type ^ that an agent
might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [6] dened a cost function as c(; ^)
for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case where c(; ^) = 0
everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where c(; ^) 2 f0;1g
[7,8]. Kephart and Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is
costless and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two kinds
of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the
revelation principle holds or not when two kinds of costs are considered. The
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose the notion of prot
function, and claim that the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mech-
anism should be based on the prot function instead of the utility function
when strategies of agents are costly (see Denition 23.D.1'). After then, we
point out two key points:
(1) Each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type. Hence
each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect
mechanism (see Proposition 1);
(2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle in
Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2).
In Section 3, we construct a simple labor model, then dene a social choice
function f and an indirect mechanism, in which strategies of agents are cost-
ly. In Section 4, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we show that f is not truthful-
ly implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under some conditions (see
Proposition 4), which contradicts the revelation principle. In the end, Section
6 draws conclusions.
1 For example, agents spend education costs in a job market [5].
2 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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2 Analysis of strategic costs
In this section, we will investigate costs spent by agents when playing strategies
in a mechanism. In the beginning ,we cite some denitions from Section 23.B
and Section 23.D of MWG's textbook [3] as follows. Consider a setting with
I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i privately observes his type i
that determines his preferences. The set of possible types of agent i is denoted
as i. The agent i's utility function over the outcomes in set X given his type
i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Note 1: Generally speaking, when an agent performs a strategic action in
participating a game, he usually spends some monetary costs (or make some
eorts which can be quantied as monetary costs). Assume each agent's costs
are only relevant to his strategic action and private type, and are independent
of the game outcome.
Formally, suppose an agent i with private type i 2 i performs a strategic
action si(i) and the game outcome is x, then his strategic costs can be denoted
as ci(si(i); i). Thus, agent i's prot is denoted as
pi(x; si(i); i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si(i); i): (1)
Denition 23.B.1 [3]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : 1 
    I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types 1;    ; I ,
assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3 [3]: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of
I strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5 [3]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ,
g0()) in which S 0i = i for all i and g0() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Note 2: In a direct mechanism, each agent's report can be considered as an
oral and costless announcement: i:e:, the strategy of each agent i with private
type i is to report a type s
0
i(i) 2 i, and s0i(i) needn't to be his private type
i. After the designer receives all reports s
0
1(1);    ; s0I(I), he must announce
the outcome f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)).
Denition 23.D.1 [3]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji] (2)
for all s^i 2 Si.
3
Note 3: In Denition 23.D.1, the utility function ui(x; i) is used to de-
ne the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Usually, in an indirect mechanism   =
(S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent i's strategy si(i) is an action that requires some
costs to be performed, i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0. In this case, the utility function
ui(x; i) only describes the utility of agent i after obtaining the outcome x but
misses his costs, thus cannot describe the whole prot of agent i 3 . Actually,
the prot function pi(x; si(i); i) should be used to dene the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism. Put in other words, Denition 23.D.1 should be
reformulated as follows:
Denition 23.D.1' The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [pi(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); s

i (i); i)ji]  E i [pi(g(s^i; s i( i)); s^i; i)ji]
(3)
i:e:,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si, in which pi is the prot of agent i given by Eq (1).
Denition 23.D.2 [3]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3 [3]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i,
g0 = f . That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Note 4: Following Footnote 2, if agent i with private type i chooses s
0
i (i) =
i in the direct mechanism  
0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), then ci(s0i(i); i) = 0,
and pi(x; si(i); i) = ui(x; i) by Eq (1). Therefore, when strategic actions of
agents are costly, although the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium should be
3 In many practical cases, strategies of agents are costly actions. Only in some
restricted cases where strategies of agents are oral announcements can strategies be
viewed costless. Thus, the traditional denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium holds
only in these restricted cases.
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reformulated from Denition 23.D.1 to Denition 23.D.1' according to Note 3,
the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility can still be dened by Denition
23.D.3.
Proposition 1: The strategic action of each agent i in the direct mechanism
 0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()) is just to report a type from i. Each agent i does
not need to take any other action to prove himself that his reported type is
truthful, and should not play any strategic action as specied in any indirect
mechanism. Hence, in a direct mechanism, each agent does not need to spend
strategic costs related to strategic actions specied in any indirect mechanism.
Proof: As pointed out in Denition 23.B.5, in the direct mechanism  0, the
strategy set S 0i = i, which means that the strategy s
0
i of agent i with private
type i is just to choose a type from i to report, i:e:, s
0
i(i) 2 i.
Obviously, the designer cannot enforce each agent to report truthfully in the
direct mechanism, and each agent does not need to take any action to prove
himself that his reported type is truthful. Otherwise, assume to the contrary
that each agent i has to submit some additional evidences to the designer in
order to prove himself that his reported type is truthful, i:e:, s0i(i) = i. Then
there will be no information disadvantage from the viewpoint of the designer :
the agents' types 1;    ; I are no longer their private information, and the
designer can directly specify his favorite outcome f(1;    ; I) without any
uncertainty after receiving agents' reports. This case contradicts the basic
framework of mechanism design, therefore the assumption does not hold.
Hence, each agent i with private type i will misreport another type s
0
i(i) 6=
i, s
0
i(i) 2 i whenever doing so is worthwhile. After the designer receives
s01(1);    ; s0I(I), he has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful
or not. What the designer can do is just to announce f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)) as
outcome. Thus, it is illegal to assume that in a direct mechanism the designer
can require each agent perform any strategic action specied in any indirect
mechanism. As a result, in a direct mechanism, each agent i does not need
to spend strategic costs related to strategic actions specied in any indirect
mechanism. 2
Discussion 1: Someone may disagree with Proposition 1 and argue that the
notion of direct mechanism can be extended as follows: For a given social
choice function f , the designer denes an \extended direct mechanism", in
which each agent reports a type, then the designer suggests each agent which
action to take, and the nal outcome function depends on agents' actions and
is just equal to f . As a result, each agent still spend strategic costs, the same
as what they spend in the indirect mechanism.
Answer 1: It should be noted that behind the so-called extended direct mech-
anism, there actually exists an underlying assumption: Each agent is willing
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to inform full details of his private strategy chosen in the indirect mechanism
to the designer. Only when this assumption holds can the designer suggest
each agent to take which strategic action after receiving an arbitrary prole
of agents' reported types.
However, in the framework of mechanism design, the strategy of each agent i
in an indirect mechanism is his private function si : i ! Si describing agent
i's choice for each possible type in i that he might have [3]. The strategy of
each agent in an indirect mechanism is his private choice. It is unreasonable to
simply assume that each agent will voluntarily inform full details of his private
strategy to the designer without obtaining any more prots. 4 Consequently,
the so-called extended direct mechanism does not hold. 2
Now we will investigate whether the revelation principle still holds or not
when strategies of agents are costly. The revelation principle for Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is cited in Appendix. Traditional explanation is as follows:
\Consider the equilibrium in an indirect mechanism, there is a mapping from
vectors of agents' types into outcomes. Now suppose we take that mapping to
be a revelation game, then no type of any agent can make an announcement
that diers from his true type and do better". We will refute this explanation
by the following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Given an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), if each
strategic action si(i) is costly, i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0, then the proof of the
revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 is wrong.
Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (see Appendix), suppose
that there exists an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements
the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that the mapping g(s()) :
1      I ! X from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into an
outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome f(), i:e:, g(s()) = f()
for all  2 1     I . By Denition 23.D.1', for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Thus, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s

i (^i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (^i); i))ji]
4 The notion of direct mechanism dened in MWG's book does not need the so-
called assumption (see Denition 23.B.5, [3])
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for all ^i 2 i.
Since g(s()) = f() for all , then for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(f(i;  i); i) ci(si (i); i))ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i) ci(si (^i); i))ji];
(4)
for all ^i 2 i. Note that this inequality cannot infer the inequality in Def-
inition 23.D.3, which represents the sucient condition of Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility. Consequently, the proof of the revelation principle given in
Proposition 23.D.1 is wrong. 2
3 A labor model and a social choice function f
Here we construct a labor model which uses ideas from the rst-price sealed
auction model in Example 23.B.5 [3] and the signaling model [3,5]. There are
one rm and two agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 dier in the number of units
of output that they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted by private
productivity type. The rm chooses wage w > 0 and wants to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible, and the two agents compete for this job.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two agents are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each agent i's productivity type i (i = 1; 2) is his private information.
2) There is a certicate that the rm can announce as a hire criterion. If each
of (or neither of) two agents has the certicate, then each agent will be hired
with probability 0.5. The education level corresponding to the certicate is
eH > 0. Each agent decides by himself whether to get the certicate or not,
hence the possible education level ei of each agent i = 1; 2 is eH or 0. The
education level does nothing for an agent's productivity.
3) The strategic cost of obtaining education level ei for agent i (i = 1; 2)
with productivity type i is given by a function ci(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the
strategic cost is lower for a higher productivity agent.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity agent to report the high-
productivity type H is a xed value cmis  0. In addition, a high-productivity
agent is assumed to report the low-productivity type L with zero costs.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that agent i gets the job. Recall that the rm does not know
the exact productivity types of two agents, and its aim is to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social
choice function f() = (y1(); y2()), in which  = (1; 2), yi (i = 1; 2) is the
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probability that agent i gets the job.
y1() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
;
f() = (y1(); y2()) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
: (5)
In order to implement the above social choice function f(), the rm designs an
indirect mechanism   = (S1; S2; g) as follows: Each agent i = 1; 2, conditional
on his type i 2 fL; Hg, chooses his education level as a bid ei : fL; Hg !
f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of agent i's all possible bids, and the
outcome function g is dened as:
g(e1; e2) = (g1; g2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if e1 = eH ; e2 = 0
(0:5; 0:5); if e1 = e2
(0; 1); if e1 = 0; e2 = eH
; (6)
where gi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that agent i gets the job.
Let u0 be the expected utility of the rm, then u0(e1; e2) = g11 + g22   w.
Let u1; u2 be the utilities of agent 1; 2, and p1; p2 be the prots of agent 1; 2
in the indirect mechanism   respectively, then for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(ei; ej; i) =
8>><>>:
w; if ei > ej
0:5w; if ei = ej
0; if ei < ej
; (7)
pi(ei; ej; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ci(ei; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ei=i: (8)
The item \ei=i" in Eq (8) stands for the strategic costs spent by agent i
with type i when he performs the strategy ei in the indirect mechanism.
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Suppose the reserved utilities of agent 1 and agent 2 are both zero, then the
individual rationality (IR) constraints are: pi(ei; ej; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
4 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 3: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f()
given in Eq (5) is Bayesian implementable, i.e., it can be implemented by the
5 For the case of ei < ej , there will be ei = 0.
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indirect mechanism   given by Eq (6) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, agents with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
e1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; e2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (9)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume ej(j) (j = 1; 2) takes this form, i:e:,
ej(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (10)
then we consider agent i's problem (i = 1; 2; i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg,
agent i solves a maximization problem: maxei h(ei; i), where by Eq (8) and
Footnote 5, the object function is
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=i)P (ei > ej(j)) + (0:5w   ei=i)P (ei = ej(j)) (11)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (10).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (10).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (10).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
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Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (10).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
then the strategy ei (i) of agent i
ei (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (12)
will be the optimal response to the strategy ej(j) of agent j (j 6= i) given
in Eq (10). Therefore, the strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises
the individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (8) and Eq (12),
the (IR) constraints are changed into: 0:5w   eH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2
(2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq (6) and Eq (12), for any
 = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(e1(1); e

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (13)
which is the social choice function f() given in Eq (5). Thus, f() can be
implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
5 The Bayesian implementable f is not truthfully implementable
In this section, we will show by the following proposition that a Bayesian
implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which
means that the revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of
agents are costly.
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Proposition 4: If the misreporting cost cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), then the social choice
function f() given in Eq (5) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (1;2; f()), in which
1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  = (1; 2) 2 1  2. Each agent i (i = 1; 2) with
private type i reports a type ^i 2 i to the rm 6 . Then the rm performs
the outcome function f(^1; ^2) as specied in Eq (5).
According to Proposition 1, in the direct mechanism, each agent i only reports
a type and does not spend the strategic costs. The only possible cost needed
to spend is the misreporting cost cmis for a low-productivity agent to falsely
report the high-productivity type H . For agent i (i = 1; 2), if his true type is
i = L, by Eq (8) his prot function will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (14)
If agent i's true type is i = H , his prot function will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (15)
Note that the item \ei=i" occurred in Eq (8) disappears in Eq (14) and
Eq (15), because each agent i does not spend strategic costs in the direct
mechanism. Following Eq (14) and Eq (15), we will discuss the prot matrix
of agent i and j in four cases. The rst and second entry in the parenthesis
denote the prot of agent i and j respectively.
Case 1: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
6 Here ^i may not be equal to i.
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Case 2: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent i is to falsely report ^i = H , otherwise agent i would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
Case 3: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent j is to falsely report ^j = H , otherwise agent j would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
Case 4: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for both agent i and agent j is to falsely report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique equilibri-
um of the game induced by the direct mechanism  0 is to xedly report
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the unique outcome of  
0 is that each agent has the
same probability 0.5 to get the job oer. Consequently, the truthful report
^i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the di-
rect revelation mechanism. By Denition 23.D.3, the Bayesian implementable
social choice function f() given in Eq (5) is not truthfully implementable in
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the conditions of w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) and
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), which means that the revelation principle does not always
hold when strategies of agents are costly. 2
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether the revelation principle holds or not when
strategies of agents are costly. In Section 2, we propose the notion of prot
function, and claim that the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mecha-
nism should be based on the prot function instead of the utility function when
strategies of agents are costly. This is the key point why the proof of revelation
principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong when strategies are costly.
In Section 3, we propose a simple labor model, in which agents spend strategic
costs in an indirect mechanism. Section 4 and Section 5 give detailed analysis
about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the prot function of each agent i = 1; 2
is given by Eq (8), and the separating strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) is the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium when wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social
choice function f can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) In the direct mechanism, the prot function of each agent is modied from
Eq (8) to Eq (14) and Eq (15). Under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the
unique equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism is to xedly
report (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the truthful report ^

i = i (for all i 2 i,
i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which means that the revelation
principle does not hold in this case.
3) Dierent from Kephart and Conitzer [6], the revelation principle can fail to
hold even when misreporting cost cmis = 0 (see Proposition 4).
Appendix
Proposition 23.D.1 [3]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
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g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1) 7 , the condition for
f() to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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